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I. INTRODUCTION

Under the leadership of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the U. S. Supreme
Court has engineered significant changes in habeas corpus procedures. 2 Any
change in law or public policy has consequences for the human beings whose
lives come into contact with the changed law or policy. Critics have accused
the Rehnquist Court of "dismantl[ing] access to federal habeas corpus review
guaranteed by statute since 1867."3 As a result, concerns have emerged
regarding the consequences for potential petitioners whose claims can no
longer be reviewed by federal judges.4 Foremost among these concerns is the
fear that an innocent person may be executed because there was no opportunity

lAssociate Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. A.B., Harvard
University, 1980; M.Sc., University of Bristol (U.K.), 1981;J.D., University of Tennessee,
1984; Ph.D., University of Connecticut, 1988.
2See, e.g., Rudolph Alexander, Jr., The Demise of State Prisoners' Access to Federal

HabeasCorpus,6 CRIM. J. POL. REv. 55(1992) (critique of Rehnquist Court's decisions that
have curtailed state prisoners' access to federal court review of constitutional claims in
habeas corpus proceedings).
3 Margery Malkin
Koosed, Habeas Corpus: Where Have All the Remedies Gone?, TRIAL
(July 1993): 70-79.
4 Alexander,
supra note 2, at 65 ('[T~hese new decisions facilitate unfairness and
injustices.'); Koosed, supra note 3, at 72 ("[Tlhe Court essentially disincorporates those
rights guaranteed to petitioners through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause by tying relief to prejudice.").
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for federal judicial review of a capital case. 5 While the fate of death row inmates
is the most important consequence of habeas corpus reform, anecdotal reports
on these controversial cases provide an incomplete picture of the impact of
habeas reform. Judicial initiatives to reform habeas corpus affect people other
than petitioners. Although the impact on officials within the justice system may
appear less visible and compelling than the fate of death row inmates, an
examination of other actors affected by habeas corpus reform sheds light on
unrecognized consequences of the Rehnquist Court's decisions. This article
examines the perspective of assistant state attorneys general, important actors
in the habeas corpus process, toward the Supreme Court's habeas corpus
reform.
A. The States'Attorneys

Although assistant attorneys general represent the state in habeas
proceedings and are key actors in post-conviction legal proceedings, they have6
received scant attention from scholars who study the justice system.
Whenever a habeas petition survives initial review by the U.S. district court
and is served upon the state,7 a state attorney must draft an answer to begin
the process of justifying the petitioner's prosecution and conviction. State
attorneys labor in relative obscurity and can never hope to receive the public
recognition and career rewards bestowed on prosecutors who obtain trial court
convictions in highly publicized criminal cases. Because habeas petitioners are
so rarely successful, 8 states attorneys' jobs appear relatively easy. However,
states attorneys face special pressures, including the fear that a guilty offender
may go free if a state attorney does not apply meticulous care to each case. The
fact that many habeas cases concern trials that occurred many years earlier

5

See Christopher E. Smith & Avis Alexandria Jones, The Rehnquist Court's Activism
and the Risk of Injustice, 26 CONN. L. REV. 53, 66-75 (1993) (descriptions of capital cases
with significant questions about the death row inmates' culpability for murder in which
new Rehnquist Court decisions blocked federal habeas review of petitioners' claims).
6
Scholars who study the justice system usually focus their research on judges or on
interest groups that attempt to use the courts to advance policy preferences. See JOHN
B. GATES & CHARLES A. JOHNSON(EDS)., THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICALASSESSMENT

(1991) (collection of articles reviewing the state of contemporary research on the legal
system).
7

Because habeas corpus petitions are typically filed pro se by prisoners who may
lack literacy skills, education, knowledge of law, and access to legal research materials,
see Christopher E. Smith, Examining the Boundaries of Bounds: Prison Law Libraries and
Access to the Courts, 30 HOWARD L. J. 27, 34-36 (1987), such petitions are especially
susceptible to being returned to the petitioners due to technical defects or dismissed sua
sponte for failing to state a valid claim. See Donald H. Ziegler & Michele G. Hermann,
The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 157, 176-187 (1972).
8
For example, the most recent major study of habeas corpus found that petitions
filed in federal courts are typically successful in less than one percent of cases. VICTOR
E. FLANGO, HABEAS CORPUS IN THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 62 (1994).
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exacerbates this fear. If a successful petition results in a new trial, even a guilty
defendant may go free if witnesses have died or evidence has been lost. In the
adversary context of habeas proceedings, the work and effectiveness of
assistant attorneys general are important elements in case outcomes.
In October 1994, researchers mailed survey forms to the Attorney General of
each of the fifty states. The survey contained questions which emerged from
an extended group interview with assistant attorneys general in one state. The
mailing targeted assistant attorneys general responsible for handling habeas
corpus cases in the federal courts of each state. Assistant attorneys general in
twenty-seven states returned eighty-nine survey forms. The respondents
represented states in every region of the country, including states which
provided for capital punishment and states which did not. To encourage frank
responses, the survey assured respondents that aggregate data analysis would
protect anonymity. In addition to a few specific questions about the attorneys'
perceptions of habeas corpus, the survey contained space for additional
comments. These comments provided perspective on the attorneys'
assessments of the consequences of recent developments in habeas corpus
proceedings.
Reform efforts initiated by the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions concerning
habeas corpus favor state interests by limiting habeas petitioners' access to
federal courts. These judicial reforms ostensibly reduce the burdens placed on
the state attorneys who must respond to habeas petitions. However, the results
of this survey indicate the dissatisfaction many assistant attorneys general
exhibit toward recent changes affecting habeas corpus. These attorneys believe,
in particular, that many judicial officers in federal district courts do not comply
with Supreme Court precedent involving habeas corpus.
II. JUDICIAL REFORM OF HABEAS CORPUS

Federal statutes permitting federal 9 and state prisoners 10 to file
post-conviction petitions raising constitutional claims for review by federal
judicial officers govern habeas corpus proceedings. Because habeas corpus
provides an additional, post-appeal opportunity for a state prisoner to
challenge his or her conviction in a new forum, habeas corpus implicates issues
of finality, comity, and the redundant expenditure of federal judicial
resources.11 In an effort to reduce these problems purportedly caused by the
broad availability of habeas corpus, 12 William Rehnquist has sought to restrict
9 See
10 See
11

28 U.S.C. § 2255.
28 U.S.C. § 2254.

LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 161 (1994). By contrast, Larry

Yackle argues that efforts to limit habeas corpus stem not from these issues, but from
opposition by political conservatives to the Warren Court's decisions expanding the
definition of constitutional rights for criminal defendants. Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas
Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2352, 2356 (1993).
12
Chief Justice Rehnquist is reported to believe that these problems burden the
federal courts and should be corrected through significant reforms:
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1996
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access to habeas corpus 13 as both an Assistant Attorney General for the Nixon
Administration, 14 and later as the Chief Justice of the United States.15 As Chief
Justice, Rehnquist appointed retired Justice Lewis Powell to head a committee
charged with making recommendations for reforming habeas procedures in
capital cases. Without waiting for approval from the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Rehnquist presented the Powell Committee's recommendations
to Congress. 16 Rehnquist's precipitous action generated an unusual public
17
rebuke from a majority of judges on the Judicial Conference. Ultimately,
Congress was unable to reach agreement on changes in habeas corpus
18
procedures.
Rehnquist and like-minded colleagues proceeded with reform despite the
unwillingness of Congress to alter the statutes governing habeas corpus.
Although statutory law governs habeas corpus, and therefore presumptively
places habeas corpus under the control of Congress, the Supreme Court has
19
altered habeas procedures through its judicial decisions. In a series of
decisions, the Supreme Court erected a variety of barriers to petitioners seeking
post-conviction vindication of their federal constitutional claims. In Teague v.

Rehnquist had become determined to change the [habeas corpus]
system. It was chaotic, wasteful, and an abuse of the people's right
to have laws enforced, he contended in a series of speeches ....
Rehnquist was especially upset by inmates who strung out their
cases by filing one habeas corpus petition after another. He
wanted the law changed to give these inmates a one-time shot.
DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT
412-413 (1992).
13 Rehnquist's earliest documented action to limit habeas corpus came in a
memorandum entitled "Habeas Corpus Then and Now; Or, 'fI Can Just Find the Right
Judge, Over These Prison Walls I Shall Fly....'," which he prepared in the early 1950s
in his capacity as law clerk to Justice Robert Jackson at the U.S. Supreme Court. Yackle,
The Habeas Hagioscope,supra note 11, at 2343,n. 52.
141d. at 2353-55.
15Id. at 2367-70.
16 1d. at 2370, n.165.
17 Linda Greenhouse, Judges Challenge Rehnquist's Role on Death Penalty:
ExtraordinaryMove, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,1989, at Al.

An

18Yackle, The HabeasHagioscope,supranote 11, at 2371. However, with the assumption
of congressional control by a new Republican majority after the 1994 elections, theHouse
of Representatives has pushed forward legislation to streamline habeas procedures. See
Katharine Q. Seelye, House Approves Easing of Rules on U.S. Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
1995, at Al, A10.
19

The Court has preserved aspects of habeas corpus in some cases, apparently
because a full majority of justices does not support the most drastically suggested
curtailment of the writ. See Yale L. Rosenberg, The Supreme Court Reinforces Both Federal
Habeas Corpus and Miranda,29 CRIM. L. BULL. 418 (1993).
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Lane20 and Penry v. Lynaugh,21 the Court "significantly narrowed the scope of
federal habeas by excluding claims based on 'new constitutional rules of civil
procedure,' or rules that are announced after a defendant's conviction becomes
'final."' 22 In McCleskey v. Zant,23 the Court limited opportunities for filing
successive petitions. In Coleman v. Thompson,24 the Court turned state
25
procedural defaults into forfeitures of federal claims. In Brecht v. Abrahamson,
the Court established stricter standards for determining whether trial court
errors are substantial enough to justify granting relief. These and other
Supreme Court cases have produced a "trend in the Court's decisions...to
elevate technical performance above the substance in the evaluation of claims
of federal rights violations."2 6 As a result, the Court has created additional bases
for state attorneys to prevail without federal judicial officers ever considering
the merits of a petition. For example, a state attorney may prevail by simply
asserting successive petitions or procedural default in state court.
III. THE ADVOCATES' LAMENT

Despite benefitting from the Supreme Court's recent doctrinal changes
affecting habeas corpus, assistant state attorneys general who handle such
cases express deep dissatisfaction with habeas corpus. This dissatisfaction
involves two central aspects. First, assistant state attorneys general in their
adversarial posture as representatives of the state have little regard for the
potential meritoriousness of the habeas petitions which absorb their working
lives. The skepticism toward habeas petitions generates frustration regarding
the amount of time assistant attorneys general spend responding to petitions
perceived as worthless and doomed. Second, assistant attorneys general are
frustrated by the perceived insubordination by lower court federal judicial
officers who fail to comply with the Supreme Court's new doctrines.
A. Perceptionsof Frivolousness
Anecdotal evidence contained in the attorneys' additional comments to the
survey indicated frustration with the frivolousness of some habeas petitions
and the significant amounts of time "wasted" in litigating these cases. A
respondent characterized the entire concept of habeas corpus as a "federal

20489 U.S. 288 (1989).
21492 U.S. 302 (1989).
22

joseph L. Hoffmann, The Supreme Court's New Vision of Federal Habeas Corpus for

State Prisoners,1989 Sup. CT. REV. 165, 166.
23499 U.S. 467 (1991).
24501 U.S. 722 (1991).
25507 U.S. 619 (1993).
26j. Thomas Sullivan, A

PracticalGuide to Recent Developments in FederalHabeasCorpus

for PracticingAttorneys, 25 ARIz. ST. L. J.317,317 (1993).
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attemp[t] to interfere with state prosecutions"- a characterization which
certainly constitutes a pejorative description of a legal action initiated by
individuals and explicitly intended to provide a vehicle for vindication of
constitutional rights. All respondents indicated that such cases were
problematic. Some respondents criticized habeas corpus in the strongest
possible terms:
"[1If I would have to list the things about the law that make me want
to take a different career path, habeas litigation would have to be near
the top of the list."
"The costs associated with responding to habeas petitions are
escalating. Almost all [petitions] are entirely frivolous, but the expense
of providing the federal courts with copies of the state court records
are quite substantial. Also, the amount of time spent on habeas
petitions is substantial (especially for new attorneys unfamiliar with
habeas law) and takes away from time that could be better spent on
state appeals and other matters. 28 U.S.C. [sec.] 2254[, the federal
statute governing federal review of state habeas cases,] should be
repealed."
The survey questioned respondents about the number of cases each had
handled in which the writ had been granted and the number of cases each had
handled in which the respondents believed that the writ should have been
granted. Tables I and 2 illustrate the responses to these questions. Consistent
with findings from studies of habeas case outcomes, 27 petitioners rarely
succeeded in the cases handled by the respondents. Over eighty percent of
respondents had lost four or fewer of their cases, and thirty-seven percent had
never seen a petitioner succeed.
Table 1 - Habeas Corpus Petitions Granted: Descriptive Assessment
by Assistant State Attorneys General:
Number of Cases Handled in Which Writ Was Granted
CEspondn
[N=88]
0
1
2
3
4
5
6

33 (37.5%)
15 (17.0%)
13 (14.8%)
3(3.4%)
7(8.0%)
4(4.5%)
1 (1.1%)

27

FLANGO,supra note 8, at 62; Richard Faust, et al., The Great Writ in Action: Empirical
Light on the Federal Habeas Corpus Debate, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 637, 680
(1990-91); David L. Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts,87 HARV.

L. REV. 321, 334 (1973).
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Table 1 continued
caska

Respondents (%)

[N=88]
7
8

1 (1.1%)
1 (1.1%)

9
10
>10

2(23%)
2 (2.3%)
6 (6.8%)

Table 2 - Habeas Corpus Petitions Granted: Normative Assessment
by Assistant State Attorneys General:
Number of Cases Handled in Which Assistant Attorney General Believes Writ
Correctly Granted Or Should Have Been Granted
Cae
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
>10

Respondents%)
[N=86]
51 (59.3%)
16(18.6%)
7(8.1%)
2(2.3%)
1(1.2%)
3 (3.5%)
1(1.2%)
0(0)
1(1.2%)
1(1.2%)
0(0)
3 (3.5%)

Not surprisingly, given the adversarial structure of the American legal
system, the states' advocates believed that even fewer writs were meritorious
than the small number actually granted. Nearly sixty percent of respondents
declared they had never opposed a meritorious petition and nearly ninety
percent indicated they had participated in three or fewer cases in which the
writ was or should have been properly granted. In light of the attorneys'
near-consensus that meritorious petitions are exceedingly rare, if not
non-existent, the respondents' frustration with the amount of work required
for habeas corpus petitions is not surprising. One respondent indicated that
habeas corpus cases involve special problems because no guarantee exists that
difficult, old cases will not resurface for consideration:
Federal habeas petitions are troublesome because they often involve
cases that are very old. Because the cases are old, it is often difficult to
find witnesses and documents. I currently have a federal habeas case
in which the petitioner was convicted in 1984.
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1996
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Because of the attorneys' deep-seated dissatisfaction with habeas corpus, the
frustration with judicial actions believed to improperly favor petitioners or
otherwise disobey the Supreme Court's directives comes as no surprise.
B. Perceptionsof Non-Compliance
The survey addressed the issue of compliance by federal district court judges
and magistrate judges28 with the Supreme Court's habeas reform decisions.
Obviously, the impact of judicially-initiated habeas reforms depends on the
compliance of federal judicial officers. If the Supreme Court's new barriers
limiting the number of habeas petitions and the consumption of federal judicial
resources by the petitioners are to have the desired effect, judicial officers in the
district courts must comply with the high court's intentions. Federal judicial
officers are both the "interpreters" and "implementers" of the Supreme Court's
habeas decisions affecting procedures and standards of review. 29 These officers
are responsible for determining the meaning of the high court's decisions and
implementing those decisions by ruling on habeas petitions brought to the
federal district courts for review. If federal judges misinterpret 30 or
intentionally subvert 31 the Supreme Court's decisions, the high court's policy
goals remain unfulfilled. As indicated by Table 3, a majority of respondents
(52.9%) believed that federal judicial officers do not comply with the Supreme
Court's recent habeas corpus decisions. Table 3 includes only unequivocal
endorsements of judicial officers as "yes" responses. Table 3 combines
unequivocal negative responses with responses indicating some negativity,
such as "usually," "most of them," and "generally," to indicate a lack of complete
judicial compliance in the eyes of the assistant state attorneys general.
Table 4 shows that respondents' dissatisfaction with federal judicial officers'
compliance with Supreme Court habeas corpus precedent was most
pronounced in capital punishment states. While a majority of attorneys (56.5%)
in such states complained about a lack of compliance, only a sizable minority
(38.1%) in non-death penalty states had similar complaints about U.S.
magistrate judges and district judges. The differences in responses may reflect

28

Prisoners' cases and Social Security appeals are two of the categories of cases most
frequently delegated to U.S. magistrate judges by U.S. district judges for review and
recommendation. Christopher E. SmithAssessing the Consequences of JudicialInnovation:
U.S. Magistrates'Trialsand Related Tribulations,23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 455, 483 (1988)
(citing ADMNISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMNISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 36 (1986)).
29

A. JOHNSON
29-105 (1984).

CHARLES

AND IMPACT

& BRADLEY C. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION

30

1d. at 54 ("Conscientious judges frequently have to make their own best guesses
about how to interpret a judicial policy and apply it to a particular set of circumstances
not considered by a higher court.").
31

1d. at 57 ("A lower court may refuse to accept a judicial decision because the judge
believes the higher court lacks the right to make such a decision.").
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol44/iss1/5
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the state attorneys' frustration with the closer judicial scrutiny of capital cases
and the higher rate of success for habeas petitioners in such cases.32
Table 3
Perceptions of Assistant State Attorneys General About Federal
Judicial Officers' Compliance with U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
Concerning Habeas Corpus
[N=85]
"Do you believe that federal judicial officers (i.e., U.S. magistrate judges and
U.S. district judges) are obeying the Supreme Court's recent decisions
concerning successive petitions, procedural defaults in state courts, and other
rules affecting habeas corpus cases?"
Yes
40 (47.1%)

Nil
45 (52.9%)

Table 4
Perceptions of Assistant State Attorneys General About Federal
Judicial Officers' Compliance with U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
Concerning Habeas Corpus: Capital Punishment States and Non-Capital
Punishment States
[N=831
"Do you believe that federal judicial officers (i.e., U.S. magistrate judges and
U.S. district judges) are obeying the Supreme Court's recent decisions
concerning successive petitions, procedural defaults in state courts, and other
rules affecting habeas corpus cases?"33
IN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STATES

Yes

27 (43.5%)

Mo

35 (56.5%)

IN NON-CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STATES

Yes

13 (61.9%)

N
8 (38.1%)

32

Justice Stevens has said that petitioners in capital cases gain relief in 60 to 70percent
of cases while habeas petitioners in other cases succeed in fewer than 7 percent of other
cases. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33
Note: The state affiliations of two respondents could not be identified due to the
absence of a legible postmark.
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1. The Compliance Problem
Interpretation and implementation allow for both intentional subversion of
the appellate courts' objectives and good faith misinterpretations of the judicial
policy makers' intentions.34 Many of the respondents to the survey
characterized U.S. district judges and magistrate judges as deliberately
defeating the Supreme Court's objectives through interpreting and applying
precedents in habeas cases. One respondent stated this viewpoint forthrightly:
"Any rules [the district judges and magistrate judges] don't like, they ignore."

Other respondents echoed this viewpoint in describing how judicial officers in
the U.S. district courts evaded the Supreme Court's decisions concerning
exhaustion of state court remedies, procedural default, successive petitions,
and deference to state court findings:
"[The] [flederal court is not dismissing petitions with unexhausted
claims, but is rather staying them pending state court exhaustion."
"Some [federal judicial officers] ignore the rules all together-others
address the merits despite a procedural default."
"Presumption of correctness of state court fact finding is seldom
respected."
"Judges avoid Teague by finding not a new rule or one of two

exceptions."
"The federal district court generally does not require the petitioner to
make a showing that state remedies have been exhausted, rather than
ordering the petitioner to make the showing, the magistrate judge
issues an order to show cause to the state requiring an attorney to file

a motion to dismiss and to copy pages and pages of state court
documents. This is very time consuming for state attorneys, especially

in cases where it is clear that state remedies have not been exhausted
because there is a direct appeal pending in the state appellate courts."
"Judges... avoid procedural default (Coleman) by interpreting state

court order[s] as intertwined with federal law."
"Where [the federal judges] go astray is in ordering evidentiary
hearings in cases in which there are state court findings (supported by
evidence) against the petitioner, where the petitioner has produced no

record evidence besides his own self-serving allegations in support of

34

For example, a most egregious example of lower court disobedience occurred in
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (1983), affd in partand rev'd in part,Jaffree v. Wallace,
713 F.2d 614 (11th Cir. Ala. 1983), affd Wallace v. Jaffree *2,472 U.S. 38 (1985), in which
a U.S. district judge asserted that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on organized
prayer in the public schools had erroneously distorted the true meaning of the First
Amendment. The court of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court overturned his decisions.
PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CoNvIcrioNs 357-367 (1988).
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his claims or ...where the evidence of guilt was so overwhelming that
the lack of prejudice was clear as a matter of law."
Some respondents blamed federal courts of appeals for leading or even
forcing the district courts to disobey the Supreme Court's precedents. As
described by one respondent.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit routinely disobeys U.S.
Supreme Court decisions re: harmless error, procedural default, and
nonretroactivity (Teague v. Lane). As a general matter, however, the 9th
Circuit will follow U.S. Supreme Court cases on abuse of writ and
successive petitions. The 9th Circuit judges seem to be convinced that
the Supreme Court's habeas jurisprudence is just wrong, and the
judges (or several of them) have taken it upon themselves to find ways
of making an end run around the Supreme Court's decisions. As a
result, the U.S. District Courts often feel compelled by 9th Circuit
precedent to do the same.
a. The Advocates' Perspective and the JudicialRole
The foregoing comments paint a picture of lower court judges exploiting the
fragmentation of judicial power in order to subvert judicial policies with which
these judges disagree. However, consideration of attorneys' comments from
the judicial officers' perspective suggests other reasons which explain the failure
to fully implement the Supreme Court's habeas decisions. A survey of U.S.
magistrate judges concerning habeas corpus reform indicated that many of
these judicial officers, who frequently bear primary responsibility for these
cases, find examination and dismissal of habeas petitions on the merits quicker
and easier than proceeding with a long, drawn-out analysis of procedural
issues.35 Because dismissal of petitions based on the merits of the claims reflects
the judicial officers' self-interest, the possibility of this dismissal forces the state
attorneys to address the merits despite Supreme Court doctrines which
indicate that the state should prevail on procedural grounds. Moreover, judicial
officers believe that they best fulfill their judicial role 36 by responding directly
35 Christopher

E.Smith, JudicialPolicy Making and Habeas CorpusReform, 7 CRIM. JUST.
POL. REV. 91, 105 (1995).
36
Research on judicial decision making has shown that "judges' decisions are a
function of what they prefer to do, tempered by what they think they ought to do, but
constrained by what they perceive is feasible to do." James L. Gibson, From Simplicity to
Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study ofJudicialBehavior, 5 POL. BEHAv. 7,9
(1983). In deciding what they ought to do, judges are guided by their conception of the
appropriate judicial role. This role is "a pattern of behavior determined by the judge's
expectations, the normative expectations that others have for the judge, and other factors
which inform the judge's conception of a judicial officer's function in the judicial
system." CHRISTOPHERE. SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 144 (1993).
Thus in examining habeas corpus petitions, judicial officers may decide that their role
demands that they examine the merits of a claim, even if the Supreme Court's habeas
doctrines present procedural grounds that ostensibly preclude review on the merits.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1996

11

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44.47

to the merits of a petitioner's claim rather than seemingly avoiding substantive
issues through dismissal on technical grounds.
State attorneys complain about judicial officers addressing the merits of
petitions as if such conduct represented simple insubordination:
The magistrate judges routinely require the state to brief both issues
such as procedural default, exhaustion, etc. AND the merits, even
when the state has a valid non-merits defense.
However, the attorneys do not seem to recognize that district court judicial
officers do not view themselves as simply obedient subordinates of Supreme
Court justices. In contrast, self-interest and aspirations to fulfill individual
visions of proper judicial roles also shape the actions of federal judicial officers.
For example, lower court judicial officers may wish to advance their own policy
preferences that favor expansive interpretation and protection of criminal
defendants' rights through the habeas corpus process. 37 Lower court judges
may also protect themselves against reversal on appeal by deciding each
petition on all possible grounds. For example, a correct decision on the merits
may avoid reexamination of the entire case if an appellate court disagrees with
the judicial officers' review of procedural issues.
With respect to the influence of judicial role, it must be remembered that both
U.S. district judges and U.S. magistratejudges view themselves as authoritative
judicial officers and they may chafe at limitations imposed by the Supreme
Court that purport to prevent them from deciding cases as they see fit. U.S.
district court judges, like justices of the Supreme Court, are appointed by the
President, confirmed by the Senate, and sworn to uphold the Constitution.
Procedural barriers that block review of habeas corpus petitions may clash with
district court judges' sworn obligations to uphold the Constitution and with
their self-image as judges who "embod[y] the federal court."38 Similarly, U.S.
magistrate judges view themselves as authoritative judicial officers 39 and have
37
Research on judicial decision making has found that judicial officers' policy
preferences are a primary influence over their decision making. With respect to the U.S.
Supreme Court, for example,
[J]ustices' policy preferences, which can be summarized in
ideological terms, are perhaps the most important factor
influenciog their behavior .... [Djifferences among the
justices stem chiefly from their preferences, and the basic
direction that most justices take on the Court seems to reflect
the attitudes about policy issues that they bring to the Court.
LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS & POLICY 298-300 (2d. ed. 1990).
38
CHRISTOPHER E. SMnmH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:

SUBORDINATEJUDGES 118 (1990).
39U.S. magistrate judges are quite open about their self-identification as authoritative
judicial officers rather than mere subordinates to U.S. district judges:
At an annual training conference for magistrates from three federal
circuits, one magistrate addressed his colleagues about the potential
for obtaining litigants' consent for magistrate-supervised trials
through the use of the title "judge." He concluded his remarks by
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol44/iss1/5
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worked diligently to obtain salary, status, authority, and title commensurate
with their sense of importance.4 0 Their assertions of judicial authorit by
examining the merits of habeas petitions may also reflect a desire to both prove
themselves as authoritative judicial officers and fulfill their sworn obligations
to uphold the Constitution. While the views expressed by state attorneys reflect
frustration with the actions of district court judicial officers, these views may
not describe simple, intentional subversion of Supreme Court policies so much
as the district court judges' self-images and self-interest.
In a related example, the adversarial posture of the states' attorneys coupled
with their interest in rapid dismissal of habeas petitions clashes with, and
ignores, the judicial officers' sense of special responsibility for handling the
cases of pro se litigants with great care:
Federal district courts put [the] burden on [the] state to prove [the]
correctness of state court judgments, ignore technical arguments and
essentially hold the hand of inmates through habeas corpus
proceedings.
From the attorneys' perspective, this judicial action indicates intentional
noncompliance with Supreme Court policy directives. However, the roots of
this noncompliance are understandable for more complex reasons than simple
insubordination. Judicial officers may perceive their noncompliance as
fulfilling their obligation to uphold the Constitution and protecting citizens'
41
right of access to the courts by taking special care with such petitions.

shaking his head with an expression of sad disbelief, saying "there
are still [district] judges out there who won't allow magistrates to
be called 'judge."' Whereupon a magistrate, from a district noted
for its conflicts between judges and magistrates, yelled from the
audience, "No kidding.' Although the magistrates at the conference
laughed in commiseration with their colleague, the emphasis given
to the subject by the speaker and the abrupt interjection by the
magistrate in the audience indicated the heartfelt importance for
which title and other aspects of status have for subordinate judicial
officers. As another magistrate said in an address to the conference,
"if we are not judicial officers, then I don't know who is."
Christopher E. Smith, The Development of a Judicial Office: United States Magistrates and
the Strugglefor Status, 14 J. LEGAL PROF. 175, 182-83 (1989).
4

OChristopher E. Smith, JudicialLobbying and Court Reform: U.S. MagistrateJudges and
the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 14 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 163,174-98 (1992).
41
Such feelings are evident, for example, in an opinion by a district court judge which
criticized the Supreme Court's decision in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), for giving
correctional officials the option of providing law libraries alone instead of legal
assistance as the means of fulfilling prisoners' right of access to the courts.
In this court's view, access to the fullest law library anywhere
is a useless and meaningless gesture in terms of the great mass of
prisoners. The bulk and complexity [of law] have grown to such an
extent that even experienced lawyers cannot function efficiently
today without the support of special tools, such as computer research
systems of FLITE, JURIS, LEXIS, and WESTLAW. To expect untrained
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The judicial officers' noncompliance usually produces precisely the same
result as compliance with technical rules, namely dismissal of the petition. For
example, the following complaint reflected sentiments that appeared in many
of the respondents' survey forms:
Judges will sometimes ignore procedural rules and skip straight to
denying on the merits-sometimes without benefit of [the state's]
brief.
Some assistant attorneys general remarked that judicial officers seem surprised
when state attorneys complain about such noncompliance. In effect, the judicial
officers seem to say 'What are you upset about? After all, you won the case."
While judicial officers may seek both to spare themselves the work of reading
procedural histories and to fulfill their judicial role conception by addressing
the merits, state attorneys view such situations very differently. From the
attorneys' perspective, judicial officers inappropriately lend legitimacy to
prisoner petitions by addressing the merits. Assistant attorneys general believe
the Supreme Court has declared that procedural deficiencies make petitions
unworthy of substantive evaluation and they strongly prefer that the message
be conveyed to prisoners: you do not deserve to have your frivolous claims
reviewed. Ironically, while previous research indicated the risk of insufficient
district court review,42 the state attorneys paint a picture of judicial officers who
scrutinize habeas petitions too closely and carefully.

laymen to work with entirely unfamiliar books, whose content they

cannot understand, may be worthy of Lewis Carroll, but hardly satisfies

the substance of constitutional duty. Access to full law libraries makes
about as much sense as furnishing medical services through books

like: "Brain Surgery Self-Taught," or "How To Remove Your Own
Appendix," along with scalpels, drills, hemostats, sponges, and sutures.
Falzerano v. Collier, 535 F. Supp. 800, 803 (D.NJ. 1982).
42

See Shapiro, supra note 27, at 337-38.

The adjudication of habeas corpus applications lies at perhaps the
lowest visibility level of any of the processes of the federal district
courts. This is particularly true with respect to petitions filed pro
se and where no lawyer is later appointed. Decisions are generally

unreported (and the option, of course, is that of the judge himself),
and there is small likelihood that the case will reach the appellate
level. When these factors are combined with the inherent repetitiveness and frequent inarticulateness of petitions, the exercise of
habeas corpus jurisdiction becomes a strong test of judicial sensi-

tivity .... [Mly study of the records left me convinced that the range

of performance on this test could not have been much wider.

.... At one end of the spectrum of judicial sensitivity was the

judge who rarely wrote an opinion, whose dismissals gave at best
only a slender indication of the basis for his actions, and whowhen receiving a referred case back from a magistrate-invariably
adopted the recommendation without comment within a day or two
of submission.
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The clash of perspectives, roles, and expectations between state advocates
and judicial officers, which creates frustration and dissatisfaction in assistant
attorneys general, has been generated by the Supreme Court's emphasis on
procedural reforms. The high court sought to create new bases for dismissing
petitions by focusing attention on technical procedural rules. Unfortunately, by
using their policy-making authority to direct attention away from the merits
of habeas petitioners' claims, the Supreme Court has inadvertently heightened
conflict between state attorneys and district court judicial officers and has set
the stage for what appears to be widespread noncompliance.
b. Capital Cases
Another element of the clash between state attorneys and judicial officers
concerns the extra care and additional noncompliance applied by judges in
capital cases. This theme arose frequently in respondents' comments on the
survey forms:
"In regards to exhaustion, the federal courts are sometimes willing to
liberally construe the claims presented in state court to find the claims
had been exhausted. This is especially true in capital cases."
"The [N]inth [C]ircuit [C]ourt of [A]ppeals has often defied precedent
on matters relating to procedural default and the rule that federal
courts may not address issues of state law. This is especially true in
capital cases."
"Courts usually apply procedural bar but in some cases, especially in
death cases, willfully ignore the [procedural] bar [rules]."
"In capital cases, Death Penalty Resource Centers are ignoring all of
the [rules and precedents] to create lengthy record/pleadings to create
delay and support their own office's expansion. Because they are
capital cases, the courts are refusing to sanction this conduct, which
only leads the attorneys to greater abuse and delay."

See also Christopher E. Smith, United States Magistrates and the Processing of Prisoner
Litigation,52 FED. PROBATION 13, 15 (Dec. 1988).
[M]agistrates and their staffs are very accustomed to, and, in fact,

expect to find grounds to dismiss [prisoners'] cases. This expectation
derives from experience, but if it is unchecked, it can lead magistrates
to review prisoners' cases with a different approach than that applied
to other kinds of tasks. Most notably, some magistrates appear to review
prisoners' cases by asking the questions, "How can I dismiss this case?,"

rather than considering, "Does this complaint contain a valid constitutional claim?" As a practical matter, this initial focus may not have any
effect upon the eventual outcomes, namely the significant number of
dismissals. However, this approach exacerbates the risk that claims
may go unrecognized because the magistrates' reviews are not beginning
with the appropriate questions for providing thorough, considered
judgments.
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The judicial officers' noncompliant behavior in such cases frustrates the
expectations of assistant attorneys general, who see the Supreme Court's policy
decisions as mandating dismissals on procedural grounds and precluding the
legitimization of habeas petitions through review on the merits. Again, the
judicial officers' noncompliance is understandable for more complex reasons
than simply willful insubordination. As described by Hoffmann:
Because they are only human, the Justices (or at least most of them),
along with most of the judges in the lower federal courts, pay much
closer attention to the outcomes in capital cases than they do in other
criminal cases....m[These cases consistently receive far closer federal
scrutiny than noncapital criminal cases, even in a relatively
conservative era and almost regardless of the particular federal judge's
ideological or jurisprudential views. And whenever a judge finds a
capital case in which he or she believes an injustice is about to be done,
the judge is naturally inclined to do whatever is in his or her judicial
a few things that arguably are not) to rectify
power (and maybe even
43
injustice.
perceived
the
The weight of responsibility for affecting life and death decisions can
understandably lead district and circuit court judges to utilize their judicial
powers to make careful decisions about capital cases. The procedural focus of
the Rehnquist Court's policy-making has unintentionally, but effectively,
pushed federal judges toward noncompliance.
IV. JUDICIAL REFORM AND HABEAS CORPUS

The frustration evident in state attorney complaints is understandable when
their role as advocates is contrasted with the judicial role assumed by U.S.
district judges and U.S. magistrate judges. The assistant attorneys general
expect to benefit from the Supreme Court's decisions which provide additional
ammunition in the form of procedural defenses for prisoner adversaries who
represent the state. By contrast, the human decisionmakers beneath black robes
in federal district courts may find their perspectives shaped and their decisions
influenced by other concerns such as protecting constitutional rights as a
fulfillment of the judicial oath, avoiding reversal and reexamination of cases,
and providing careful consideration of pro se and death row petitioners'
claims. This clash of perspectives which generates attorney frustration may
stem from the Supreme Court's attempt to steer something that may be
unsteerable, namely judicial officers' attention away from the merits of claims
and toward technical compliance with a myriad of procedural rules.
These consequences of judicially-initiated habeas corpus reform are
consistent with critics' descriptions of flawed judicial policy-making
concerning other issues. Because judges are not experts on policy issues, some
43

Joseph L. Hoffmann, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the U.S. Supreme Court's
Continuing Problems with Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68 IND. L. J. 817,
821-822 (1993).
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critics label judges unable to accurately anticipate the consequences of their
policy-shaping decisions. 44 Although this criticism of judicial policy-making
may be no less true of policy-making by other branches of government,45 the
criticism is a key issue in assessing the capacity of courts to produce good public
policy.4 6 Ironically, while such perceived weaknesses of judicial policy-making
cause critics to admonish federal judges to keep their noses out of such policy
issues as school desegregation, 4 7 prison reform, 48 and other issues about which
judges lack expertise, habeas corpus is an entirely different issue. Habeas
corpus concerns court-centered issues of justice, rights, and legal procedures
that are presumably within the ambit of Supreme Court justices' special
expertise as experienced lawyer-judges. It appears, however, that the justices
may lack a comprehensive understanding of the way in which lower court
judges' interests, self-image, and judicial role conceptions could undercut the
high court's intentions and thereby generate additional frustrations for the
states' attorneys, whose raised expectations about reduced workloads and easy
victories remain less-than-completely fulfilled.
Unlike institutions in other branches of government, the Supreme Court
remains relatively detached from other institutions and segments of society,
and this detachment helps to reinforce the Court's image as neutral,
non-political, and independent. 4 9 Unfortunately, such detachment can also
adversely affect actions taken by Supreme Court justices, indicating that the
Court does not understand the functioning of the society it shapes and the lives
of the citizens it impacts. 50 In this instance, thejustices have demonstrated their
44See DONALD L. HORowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 52 (1977) ("[tjhe courts
suffer from an unusual poverty of resources to minimize the incidence of unintended
consequences in advance and especially to detect and correct them once they occur.").
45
See Stephen L. Wasby, Arrogation of Power or Judicial Accountability: Judicial
ImperialismRevisited, 65 JUDICATURE 208,208-219 (1981).
46

CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 49 (1993).

47

See, e.g., LINA A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE, THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON

RACE AND THE SCHOOL (1976) (critique of judicial interventions in school systems that
use court-ordered busing as a remedy).
48
See, e.g, Daniel J. Popeo & George C. Smith, Court Supervision of Prisons Is
Unnecessary, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE OppOSING VIEwPOINTs 389-395 (1987) (arguments
favoring judicial deference to administrative officials in decisions concerning
management of prisons).
49

RiCHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS 6-7

(1994).
50

For example, in 1989 Chief Justice Rehnquist led a highly-publicized effort to gain
salary increases for all federal judges. In publicizing the need for raises through a report
issued by the Judicial Conference and a press conference, the Chief Justice and his
colleagues in the third branch made arguments which indicated that they did not
understand that their salary and status were far above those of most other citizens:
[A federal judge] prominently quoted by the judges' committee
advocating pay raises, said, ' The long term financial sacrifice for
my family is too much. I cannot sentence them to a lifetime of
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detachment from the judicial officers in the lower federal courts by elevating
and encouraging unfulfilled expectations possessed by assistant state attorneys
general while inadvertently pushing U.S. district judges and magistrate judges
to avoid complete compliance with the Supreme Court's new habeas corpus
precedents. Such consequences appear to place the Supreme Court on equal
footing with legislatures, whose judicial reform statutes have been thwarted
by decisions of lower court judges. 51 These consequences simultaneously raise
questions about whether contemporary judicial reform of habeas corpus
represents careful, measured deliberations about important policies and
procedures or precipitous actions by a Court majority intent upon sharply
limiting petitioners' access to habeas corpus.5 2 In order to be effective, any
judicial reform must be based on careful consideration of probable
consequences in light of an accurate understanding of how the justice system
actually works, including the roles and interests of lower court officials affected

genteel poverty." For anyone earning at least $89,500 annually,
a sum that is over four times greater than that of the median
salary for full-time American workers, to speak of living in
poverty is outrageous. This characterization not only ignores
the fact that millions of Americans are unemployed, homeless,
and lacking medical insurance, but it bespeaks an absence of
sensitivity to the harsh realities of life in American society and
undeniably privileged position enjoyed by citizens who receive
the relatively high salaries of federal judges. [emphasis supplied]
Christopher E. Smith, FederalJudicial Salaries: A CriticalAssessment, 62 TEMPLE L. REV.
849,864 (1989).
51When legislatures attempt to impose sentencing reform, bail reform, or other
initiatives upon the judicial branch, the fragmentation of the judicial system permits
judges within individual courthouses to thwart implementation of changes that they do
not support. See MALCOLM FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL (1984).
52

Because justices' decisions are motivated significantly by their personal policy
preferences, see supra note 37 and accompanying text, and Chief Justice Rehnquist has
long sought through not-always-careful means to change habeas corpus, see supra note
17 and accompanying text, there is a risk that some justices are myopically pursuing
habeas corpus reform with the motives and tactics attributed by Yackle to critics of
habeas corpus over the course of the past thirty years:
It was no accident that Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)]
and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)] were handed down the same
day: The writ of habeas corpus was the procedural analogue of the
Warren Court's substantive interpretations of the Constitutionproviding federal machinery for bringing new constitutional values
to bear in concrete cases.
. .. More recent opposition [to habeas corpus] springs, however,
from a different source: a conservative reaction to the Warren Court's
criminal procedure decisions. It is because the current criticism of the
writ is basic, substantive, and ideological that proposals advanced for
change are insufficient (to critics) if they promise merely to expedite
or streamline habeas litigation, but would not abolish the writ altogether.
Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope,supra note 11, at 2349.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol44/iss1/5

18

1996]

JUDICIAL REFORM OF HABEAS CORPUS

by the reform. 53 If reforms are motivated simply by legislators' or appellate
court judges' political values and policy preferences, reforms are much less
likely to achieve their desired objectives. 54 It may very well be the case that the

Supreme Court's judicial habeas corpus reforms have impaired the possibilities
for effective reform by misapprehending the nature and power of lower court
judges' interests and role perceptions. As a result, the lamentations of the states'
attorneys are likely to continue.

53

See e.g., CANDACE MCCOY, POLmCS AND PLEA BARGAINING (1993) (study of plea
bargaining reform in California demonstrating how the elimination of plea bargaining
for certain cases in Superior Court simply moved plea bargaining to an earlier stage of
the justice process in the lower level Municipal Court).
54
Reforms aimed at components of the criminal justice system, particularly if they
emanate from a national institution, are frequently ineffective because their underlying
political intentions can do no more than produce symbolic benefits for the
politically-motivated policy makers rather than practical benefits for the social problem
being addressed. See, e.g., STUART SCHEiNGOLD, THE POLMCS OF STREET CRME 182 (1991)
("National political leaders tend to be distanced from the real world of criminal process
....With crime an abstraction and the consoling message of the myth of crime and
punishment at their disposal, there is simply no motivation to face up to the costs of
structural responses.").
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